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tion suspending the exercise of the right is one to which the
obligee has agreed, there should be no reason to apply the maxim
contra non valentem.17 Personal obligations containing a sus-
pensive or resolutory condition 18 would not be affected and the
general rule of suspension of prescription would be applicable.
If the result of the present policy as to mineral rights is desirable,
the implication of Chief Justice O'Niell's opinion should be
adopted.
J. M. S.
MINES AND MINERALS-SUSPENSION OF PRESCRIPTION-OBSTACLE
TO EXERCISE OF SERVTUDE-Plaintiffs inherited their mother's half
interest in a tract of land which had belonged to the matrimonial
community. Subsequently, their father sold a fourth interest in
the mineral rights, reserving the exclusive right to lease. This
interest was later acquired by the defendants. The plaintiffs con-
tend that the defendants' rights have been lost by the prescription
of ten years, liberandi causa. Held, that there was no obstacle
preventing the exercise of the servitude which would suspend the
non-user prescription of Article 792 of the Civil Code.1 Hightower
v. Maritzky, 195 So. 518 (La. 1940) .2
The principle of Article 792 has been invoked in several cases
involving mineral rights. Where one co-owner of mineral rights
was prevented from going upon the property by the other co-
owner who was at the same time the landowner, the court point-
ed out that the landowner could have been forced to permit
entry8 and that therefore the non-user prescription had not been
17. For a discussion of "obstacle," see Note (1940) 2 LOUISIANA LAW RE-
vxmw 755; notes 2, 12, supra; Comment (1938) 12 Tulane L. Rev. 244.
18. As to resolutory conditions, it was stated in DeMontluzin Co. v. New
Orleans & N.E. Ry., 166 La. 822, 828, 118 So. 33, 35 (1928) that: "The [reso-
lutory] action, although it may result in the recovery of immovable property,
is regarded as a personal action, and as barred by the prescription, liberandi
causa, of ten years established by Article 3544 of the Civil Code, by which
all personal actions not otherwise provided for are prescribed. . . . This
prescription begins to run the moment the cause of action to enforce the
condition arises." (Italics supplied.) See cases cited therein, and State v.
Fontenot, 192 La. 95, 187 So. 66 (1939).
1. Art. 792, La. Civil Code of 1870: "If the owner of the estate to whom the
servitude is due, is prevented from using it by any obstacle which he can
neither prevent nor remove, the prescription of nonusage does not run
against him as long as this obstacle remains."
2. Other problems are presented in the report of this case, but the present
discussion is limited to the points indicated.
3. Art. 655, La. Civil Code of 1870. Clark v. Tensas Delta Land Co.,
172 La. 913, 136 So. 1 (1931).
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suspended.4 Likewise, a landowner's lease of mineral rights prior
to the expiration of the ten year prescription period did not give
a right to explore while the servitude was in existence and was
therefore not an obstacle which could suspend the prescription. 5
In one case, mineral rights had been purchased subject to an
existing lease and it was contended that the lease was an ob-
stacle sufficient to "interrupt"6 the running of prescription against
the servitude; however the court found that the lease was the
factor which induced the defendants to purchase the mineral
rights and held that the servitude had been extinguished by
prescription.7 In another case, purchasers of mineral rights were
held to have legal knowledge of prior recorded leases which could
not be urged as an obstacle to the prescription against their ser-
vitude.8
From the wording of Article 792, it seems clear that to sus-
pend prescription the obstacle must be one to which the owner
of the servitude has not consented.9 In the instant case, the ven-
dor's reservation of the exclusive right to lease was held not to
be an obstacle which would suspend prescription. The court de-
scribed the transaction as a sale of a "limited servitude," 10 because
the obstacle or restriction had been consented to by the vendee.
The court pointed out that parties may impose any restriction
or regulation upon the enjoyment of a servitude, but they cannot
dispense with the running of prescription. 1
In the principal case, the defendants also invoked the rule
4. Clark v. Tensas Delta Land Co., 172 La. 913, 136 So. 1 (1931). See also
Myers v. Cooke, 175 La. 30, 142 So. 790 (1932). The court stated, however, that
the contention might have been sustained under the rule "Contra non valen-
tern agere nulla currit praescriptio" if the landowner had prevented the ser-
vitude owner from exercising his right. But in both the Clark case and the
Myers case it was clear that no attempt had been made to exercise the ser-
vitudes.
5. Gayoso Co. v. Arkansas Natural Gas Corp., 176 La. 333, 145 So. 677
(1933).
6. Art. 792, La. Civil Code of 1870, clearly indicates a suspension and not
an interruption of prescription. This point was not discussed by the court,
since the lease was found not to be an obstacle at all.
7. Coyle v. North Central Texas Oil Co., 187 La. 238, 174 So. 274 (1937).
8. Galley v. McFarlain, 193 So. 570 (La. 1940).
9. The Article refers to an obstacle which the owner of the estate can
neither prevent nor remove. See Sarpy v. Hymel, 40 La. Ann. 425, 4 So. 439
(1888).
10. It seems, however, that the servitude was "so limited" that there was
in fact no servitude established, as the vendee had no right at all to explore
the land for minerals. Would it not have been more logical and more in line
with the apparent intention of the parties to have treated this sale as one of
"royalty"?
11. This exception is based on the rule that one cannot renounce a pre-
scription not yet acquired. Art. 3460, La. Civil Code of 1870.
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that under Article 73812 the right to exercise a servitude was sus-
pended when the servitude had been granted by only one of the
co-owners of the land. The court indicated that Article 738 pro-
vides only for suspension of the right to exercise a servitude, and
not for a suspension of the prescription. Here the defendants
could have removed the obstacle by demanding a partition under
Article 740.18 This Article seems to provide for the situation
where one co-owner has granted a servitude on his part of the
estate only; but it may possibly be taken to cover the situation
where one co-owner has granted a servitude purporting to be on
the whole property, because such a grant might be interpreted
as existing on a part only. It is the policy of the courts to prevent
the inactive preservation of mineral servitudes for indefinite
periods, and the present decision is in line with that policy.
J.T.B.
TEACHER TENURE-REDUCTION IN POSITION AND SALARY-Plain-
tiff, a public schoolteacher of ten years' experience and who had
served as a high school principal for the past three years, was de-
moted by defendant school board to a grade school position at a
salary substantially less than that which he had formerly re-
ceived. The board preferred no charges against him and failed
to allow him an opportunity for a hearing. Plaintiff seeks by
mandamus to compel his reinstatement at the salary paid him
during the prior session. Held, that reinstatement be granted and
plaintiff be awarded back pay. The action of the board was in
derogation of the Teacher Tenure Act.' The purpose of this Act
is to guarantee security to teachers in the position, grade, or status
which they have attained, and removal to a position of lower
grade and rank is a violation thereof. State ex rel. Bass v. Vernon
Parish School Board, 194 So. 74 (La. App. 1940). ,
Although the Teacher Tenure Act has been construed on sev-
12. Art. 738, La. Civil Code of 1870: "The. coproprietor of an undivided
estate can not impose a servitude thereon, without the consent of his co-
proprietor.
"The contract of servitude, however, is not null; its execution is sus-
pended until the consent of the coproprietor is given."
13. Art. 740, La. Civil Code of 1870: "If the coproprietor has established
the servitude for his part of the estate only, the consent of the other owners
is not necessary, but the exercise of the servitude must be suspended, until
his part be ascertained by partition. In this case, he to whom the servitude
has been granted, may compel the coproprietor from whom he received it, to
sue for a partition, or may sue for it himself."
1. La. Act 58 of 1936 [Dart's Stats. (1939) §§ 2267, 2267.1].
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